We show in a laboratory experiment that the same method of group induction carries different behavioral consequences. These heterogeneous treatment effects can be directly related to the quality of the relationship established between the subjects. Our results indicate the importance of manipulation checks in group-formation tasks in economic experiments.
Introduction
Research in experimental economics is increasingly concerned about how artificially created groups influence the behavior of group members. In the standard method, participants are assigned to 'minimal' groups, either randomly or based on individual preferences (for instance, for one of two painters; see Tajfel 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this study, we use the joint problem-solving task introduced in to illustrate that the same method of group induction exhibits differential treatment effects in the subsequent gift-exchange game. Effect heterogeneity is driven by differences in the quality of the relationship established between the subjects in the group-induction stage, measured as a subject's perception of the partner's behavior. Not properly accounting for treatment heterogeneity can lead to the misleading conclusion that treatment effects on the outcome variable of interest are absent.
Experimental Design
Subjects were divided into groups of two, with the role as either principal or agent being randomly assigned. This role was fixed throughout the whole experiment. In the first step, we established groups in the Group Manipulation treatment (GM). In the control treatment (NoGM), individuals performed a task in isolation. In the second part of the experiment, all subjects played a simple gift-exchange game. Here, the agent has the opportunity to take a costly action that benefits the principal, who may control the agent by imposing a minimum effort restriction (see Falk and Kosfeld, 2006 , for a similar approach).
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Treatment Manipulation
Group induction
In the GM treatment, subjects could distribute 50 experimental currency units (ECUs, where 1 ECU was worth 0.10 €) to a private or a public account. The returns to the group account were the smaller of the two contributions to the public account, doubled by the experimenter. A subject's total payment was the sum of the private and the group account. After an explanation of the game, a message on a screen asked each group of two to discuss their strategy for this game via an online chat. The coordination game had an obvious focal point, to ease the establishment of group feelings. We attempt to capture the social-ties aspect of groups that emerges from the shared experience of the principal and 3 agent and the knowledge of each other's behavior, as it is common in teambuilding activities in real firms (Buller, 1986; Salas et al., 1999) .
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Group manipulation feedback
After the game and the disclosure of the results, the subjects had to give their partners feedback on how fair they found the other's behavior. The subjects could pick any natural number between 1 (very unfair) and 5 (very fair), but
were not allowed to further explain their opinion. Both partners received this feedback before the experiment proceeded to the next stage.
Control group
Subjects in the NoGM treatment were asked to perform a slider task (developed by Gill and Prowse, 2012) . The challenge here was to bring 48 sliders into the middle position within 2:15 minutes. Participants in this task received a flat fee of 80 ECUs, independent of their performance. 
Gift-Exchange Game
In the second stage of the experiment, the agent was provided a windfall endowment of 117 ECUs by the experimenter, part of which he could transfer to the principal. The transferred amount was doubled by the experimenter. The marginal monetary costs for the agent to exert one unit of effort were set to 1.
The principal had no initial endowment, but could enforce one of the following three minimum transfers: 0, 6, or 21. Forcing the agent to provide at least a minimum compulsory effort approximates the use of control (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006 ). We elicited the agent's response to each of the control levels available for the principal to choose using the strategy method (Selten, 1967).
Sample
In total, 330 subjects participated in the experiment (172 GM and 158 NoGM subjects, respectively). However, two GM subjects appear not to have under-4
RESULTS
stood the gift-exchange game properly. 4 These agent observations are dropped from our preferred sample. All remaining results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the outliers.
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Results
We first classify the subject pairs in the GM treatment by their perceived and communicated fairness ratings. From Table 1 , it becomes apparent that in 73 percent of the cases both subjects found each others behavior 'Fair' or 'Very fair'. For those individuals, we are confident that our manipulation successfully created social groups. For the remaining individuals, the group-induction exercise is likely to not have rendered group identity salient. 
Agent
In The basic results are shown in Columns 1-3. We pool agents from groups in which at least one player was not satisfied with the partner's behavior in the group-induction stage (Not satisfied). It appears that the effort decisions of Not satisfied agents are statistically indistinguishable from the No induction agents; that is, these subjects behave as if group induction had never happened. Thus, it is not the common experience per se that drives the agent's future behavior.
However, agents for whom group induction can be expected to have worked properly (Both satisfied) exert a higher effort than both No induction and Not satisfied agents. The difference in effort is significant at 5 percent or better.
These results continue to hold in Columns 4-6, where we control for individual heterogeneity using information on the subjects' gender, age, previous experimental experience, number of semesters, and academic major. Interestingly, the effort gap between No induction and Both satisfied agents appears to decrease in the level of control, suggesting that the crowding-out effect of control ('hidden costs') is particularly pronounced when group membership is salient.
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The regressions in Table 2 ignore the fact that group induction can be expected to not have been successful for three distinct reasons: (a) the agent was not satisfied with the principal's decision; (b) the principal was not satisfied with the agent's decision; (c) both were not satisfied with each other's decision. 9 In Table 3 , we account for the possibility that different reasons for unsuccessful group induction may also trigger different behavior. To do so, we split the Not satisfied agent sample into three categories: Both not satisfied; Self not satisfied, partner is; and Self satisfied, partner not.
The results indeed reveal a more nuanced picture of the agent's behavior than Table 2 conveys: First, agents in groups in which both players were not satisfied with each other's decision in the coordination game do not differ from
No induction agents. Second, agents who were not satisfied with their partner's 6 Formal tests of over-dispersion are reported in the regression tables. 7 Our results remain qualitatively similar when we run OLS regressions instead. 8 The interplay between group assignment and hidden costs of control is further explored in Riener and Wiederhold (2012). 9 For the clarity of exposition, we use the terms 'agent' and 'principal' here, although these roles were not yet assigned when group induction took place. Individual heterogeneity is controlled for using biographic information on gender, age, experimental experience, number of semesters, and academic major. Experimental experience is a binary variable, which takes the value of 1 if a subject participated in an experiment in the past and 0 otherwise. The subject's academic major belongs to either of the following categories (see also Ploner et al., 2012) : business administration and economics, other social sciences, humanities, engineering and natural sciences, as well as unknown/no student. Since not all individuals provide evaluable biographic information in the questionnaire at the end of the experiment, the number of observations in Columns 4-6 reduces to 146. A full set of session dummies is also included. The negative binomial model was chosen to take into account the over-dispersion of the data. As can be seen from the bottom of the table, the results from a likelihood-ratio test (estimated without robust standard errors) indicate over-dispersion for all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * z < 0.05, * * z < 0.01, * * * z < 0.001. decision, while the partner was, exert less effort than No induction agents as soon as the principal chooses to control. Third, agents who were satisfied with their partner's decision in the group-induction game, while the partner was not, transfer more to her than No induction agents transfer to their partners. This difference reaches statistical significance for maximum control. In Columns 4-6, we show that these findings continue to hold when individual heterogeneity is accounted for. Our results indicate the presence of a 'bad conscience' effect; agents who have disappointed the partner in the group-induction game try to compensate her in future stages of the experiment.
Principal
Next, we examine the principal's control behavior in the gift-exchange game reported in Table 4 . Interestingly, the same broad pattern as for the agent sample emerges. In Columns 1-2, analogous to Table 2 , we pool all principals for whom group induction can be expected to not have succeeded into a single category (Not satisfied). We find that the control choices of Not satisfied principals do not differ from those of principals who have never interacted with the agent before (No induction). However, treatment effects with respect to control are also absent considering principals who received-and submitted-a high fairness rating in the group-induction stage; the coefficient on Both satisfied fails to capture statistical significance at conventional levels.
In Columns 3-4, we break up the sample further, separating Not satisfied principals by the specific reason for which group induction can be expected to not have worked properly. If both the principal and agent were not satisfied with each other's decision in the group-induction stage (Both not satisfied), the principals' control choices do not significantly differ from those of No induction principals. However, principals who behaved fairly in the eyes of the agent in the coordination game, but were themselves disappointed by the agent's decision (Self not satisfied, partner is), seem to retaliate-they control significantly stronger than the baseline group. We also find some evidence for a 'bad conscience' effect. Principals who disappointed the partner before, while being satisfied themselves (Self satisfied, partner not), attempt to make up for their misbehavior; they control less strong than the baseline. This difference is significant at conventional levels when we account for individual heterogeneity (Column 4). Table 2 for a description of the further control variables. A likelihood-ratio test (estimated without robust standard errors) indicates over-dispersion of the data for all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * z < 0.05, * * z < 0.01, * * * z < 0.001. Tables 2 and 3 are used to account for individual heterogeneity (Columns 2 and 4) and session-specific effects (all columns). A likelihood-ratio test (estimated without robust standard errors) indicates over-dispersion of the data for all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * z < 0.05, * * z < 0.01, * * * z < 0.001.
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CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions
Our results imply that not only successful group induction carries behavioral consequences. Even if group induction failed, the subjects' behavior can appear similar to that in groups involving social ties. The underlying motivations for the seemingly identical behavior, however, are quite distinct. When group membership is salient, individuals appear to 'identify' with their fellow group members, resulting the well-known pattern of in-group favoritism (for instance, Tajfel, 1978; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) . When the attempt to induce group membership failed due to the misbehavior of one partner, the 'identity' effect seems to be replaced by a 'bad conscience' effect, both leading to similar outcomes.
While group-manipulation checks are already common in other behavioral sci- 
Experimental Instructions
Written (English Translation)
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your participation!
In this experiment -financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG) -you can earn money, depending on your own performance and decisions as well as the decisions of other participants. Therefore, it is important that you read these instructions carefully.
If you have questions at any time, please press the 'pause' key on your keyboard. We will come to you and answer your question. Please pose your question quietly. All participants in the experiment receive the same printed instructions. You will obtain more information on your screen as the experiment progresses. Please read this thoroughly and carefully. The information on the screen is only intended for the respective participant. Please do not look at the screens of other participants and do not talk to each other. If you offend against these rules, we are unfortunately required to expel you from the experiment.
Please switch off your mobiles now.
General Schedule
This experiment takes about 45 minutes. The experiment comprises three stages and a final questionnaire. You will receive detailed instructions for every stage during the experiment on your screen. Please read these instructions carefully.
On-Screen (English Translation)
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Questionnaire A short questionnaire will follow after the experiment. Having filled out this questionnaire, please remain seated until we call you separately for payment.
Further Schedule After you have read the instructions carefully, please wait for the other participants and then start with the computer program on your screen. After the completion of the questionnaire after the last part of the experiment you will be called individually to receive your payment. Please note that for this experiment the use of electronic devices (e.g. pocket calculators)
is not allowed. Please turn off your cell phones now.
Good luck!
On-Screen (English Translation)
Intro [The headlines (in bold) are not shown to the participants]
Welcome to the experiment! Thank you for your willingness to participate in this experiment. Please read all descriptions during the experiment carefully.
This experiment consists of three stages. At the end of the experiment, one of these stages is chosen randomly to determine your payment. Payment is made after the experiment. All payouts are rounded to the nearest 10 cents.
During the experiment, all calculations are shown in ECU. One ECU corresponds to 0.10.
For showing-up to this experiment in time, you will, in addition to your payoffs earned during the experiment, receive 2.50.
All information you provide in this experiment will be treated confidentially.
Pre-Game: Group Formation Intro
Part One
You will be asked to make a decision with one of of the other participants in this experiment -your partner. Below we will explain the decision situation.
Both you and your partner have an endowment of 50 ECUs for this task.
You can distribute this money to a private account, to a group account, or to both accounts.
Your total payoff depends on your choice how to distribute the money and on the choice of your partner. You will receive the sum of the private account 14
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and twice the minimum deposit in the group account. The following formula illustrates your payment:
Total payment = money on the private account + 2 times the minimum of your contribution to the group account and your partner's contribution to that account Before you will have to make your decision you now have the opportunity to talk with your partner about this game and your strategies how to play the game.
Pre-Game: Group Formation Chat Now, please talk to your partner about the game! Also discuss how you will play the game best! After the time has expired, you will be passed on automatically. is free to give you more than the required minimum contribution.
Pre-Game: Group Formation Game
The possible minimum contributions are:
No minimum contribution / 6 / 21
Own payoff: Your [fellow player's/partner's] transfer, which is doubled by the experimenter. You get paid that amount with a probability of 90%. With a probability of 10% you will receive the minimum contribution that you required gets this amount with a probability of 90%. With a probability of 10% he receives the minimum contribution that he required for himself (again, doubled by the experimenter).
Effort-Choice Game: Decision Principal Below you can decide how much your [fellow player/partner] at least has to a transfer to you.
Please indicate here how high the minimum requirement should be.
• No minimum Expectations Please think about with which probability your [fellow player/partner] expects you to impose each possible minimum contribution. Please provide all information in percent (that is, your numbers must add up to 100).
How likely do you think it is that your [fellow player/partner] thinks that ...
• You leave the decision to him.
• You require at least 6
• You require at least 21 requires you to contribute at least 21
